Parochial reciprocity
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Parochial reciprocity. / Columbus, Simon; Thielmann, Isabel; Zettler, Ingo; Böhm, Robert.
I: Evolution and Human Behavior, Bind 44, Nr. 2, 2023, s. 131-139.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Parochial reciprocity
AU - Columbus, Simon
AU - Thielmann, Isabel
AU - Zettler, Ingo
AU - Böhm, Robert
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023 The Authors
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Parochial altruism suggests that humans are intrinsically motivated to harm out-groups, and that this is tightly connected to a preference for benefitting their in-group. Yet, there is little evidence for the kind of unconditional out-group harm suggested by this account, nor for the assertion that it would be associated with in-group cooperation. Instead, humans selectively reciprocate actual, but also potential aggression. We therefore posit a model of parochial reciprocity, according to which individuals retaliate against actual and anticipated harms to their in-group. To test predictions arising from these competing accounts, we manipulated out-group threats and elicited preferences for the welfare of in-group and out-group members, as well as beliefs about in-group and out-group members' behaviours in an incentivised intergroup conflict game with natural groups (online sample; N = 973). In this game, individuals could pay to benefit their in-group, but had the option to additionally harm the out-group without incurring any further costs. Individuals who valued their in-group more strongly were no more likely to harm the out-group, thus contradicting parochial altruism. Instead, individuals who expected the out-group to harm their in-group preemptively retaliated the anticipated attack. Importantly, they only did so when the out-group posed an actual threat to the in-group. Taken together, the findings suggest that participation in intergroup conflict is better explained by parochial reciprocity than purely by group-based preferences.
AB - Parochial altruism suggests that humans are intrinsically motivated to harm out-groups, and that this is tightly connected to a preference for benefitting their in-group. Yet, there is little evidence for the kind of unconditional out-group harm suggested by this account, nor for the assertion that it would be associated with in-group cooperation. Instead, humans selectively reciprocate actual, but also potential aggression. We therefore posit a model of parochial reciprocity, according to which individuals retaliate against actual and anticipated harms to their in-group. To test predictions arising from these competing accounts, we manipulated out-group threats and elicited preferences for the welfare of in-group and out-group members, as well as beliefs about in-group and out-group members' behaviours in an incentivised intergroup conflict game with natural groups (online sample; N = 973). In this game, individuals could pay to benefit their in-group, but had the option to additionally harm the out-group without incurring any further costs. Individuals who valued their in-group more strongly were no more likely to harm the out-group, thus contradicting parochial altruism. Instead, individuals who expected the out-group to harm their in-group preemptively retaliated the anticipated attack. Importantly, they only did so when the out-group posed an actual threat to the in-group. Taken together, the findings suggest that participation in intergroup conflict is better explained by parochial reciprocity than purely by group-based preferences.
KW - Intergroup conflict
KW - IPD-MD
KW - Parochial altruism
KW - Reciprocity
KW - Social preferences
U2 - 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.02.001
DO - 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.02.001
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85148957894
VL - 44
SP - 131
EP - 139
JO - Evolution and Human Behavior
JF - Evolution and Human Behavior
SN - 1090-5138
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 339759944